Distr.
GENERAL

E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.2
12 March 1998


Original: ENGLISH

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-fourth session
Item 10 of the provisional agenda




QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD,
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLONIAL AND OTHER
DEPENDENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES


Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions


Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye submitted
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/61


Addendum


Visit to Sri Lanka



CONTENTS

Introduction

I. VISIT TO SRI LANKA
A. The general context
B. Visit to Jaffna
C. Visit to Batticaloa

II. THE RIGHT TO LIFE: FINDINGS AND CONCERNS
A. Violations of the right to life in the context of armed conflict
B. Violations of the right to life committed by the LTTE
C. Violations of the right to life committed by home guards
D. Violations of the right to life committed in the context of political violence

III. APPLICABLE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
A. Human rights and humanitarian law
B. The relevance of the situation of armed conflict
C. The national legislation

IV. ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA REGARDING CASES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS
A. Investigation of cases of human rights violations
B. Human Rights Commission
C. Commissions of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal and Disappearances
D. Drafting of a new constitution

V. IMPUNITY

VI. CONCLUSIONS

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

1. At the invitation of the Government of Sri Lanka, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions visited Sri Lanka from 24August to 5 September 1997. Prior to the visit, he had been in contact with the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office at Geneva, who cooperated fully and facilitated the visit. During his stay in the country, all of the Special Rapporteurs' specific requests for meetings with high-level government officials were met, except for the meeting with the President and the Deputy Minister for Defence. Similarly, visits to Jaffna, Batticaloa and Ratnapura were facilitated with appropriate briefings and meetings. While in Sri Lanka, the Special Rapporteur enjoyed freedom of movement, and freedom of access to private individuals and non-governmental organizations.

2. The purpose of the visit was to assess the situation of the right to life in the country, to investigate allegations of extrajudicial executions and to check the implementation of certain measures introduced by the Government to safeguard the right to life, as well as its efforts to investigate, prosecute and prevent such occurrences.

3. The Special Rapporteur would like to record his deep appreciation to the Government of Sri Lanka for its cooperation in facilitating his visit to the country and in responding to his requests for information and explanation. The Special Rapporteur would also like to thank the United Nations Development Programme Resident Representative and the UNDP offices in Colombo and Jaffna for the logistical and organizational support provided in connection with the mission.

4. In Colombo, the Special Rapporteur met with the following governmental representatives: the Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Minister of Justice, Constitutional Affairs, Ethnic Affairs and National Integration; the Secretary, Ministry of Defence; the Secretary, Ministry of Justice; the Secretary and Additional Secretary and other officials from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; the Attorney-General. He also met with the Inspector General of Police (IGP). In Jaffna and Batticaloa, the Special Rapporteur met with the Magistrate and the Regional Commanders of the armed forces and the police.

5. The Special Rapporteur also met members of Parliament representing various regions and parties, members of the newly established Human Rights Commission, members of the Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal and Disappearances, lawyers, representatives of local human rights and other non-governmental organizations and dozens of victims of human rights violations and their relatives.

6. The information and views obtained in the course of his visits and meetings will be reflected below under relevant subject headings.[back to the contents]

I. VISIT TO SRI LANKA

A. The general context

7. The population of the country is approximately 17.2 million, mainly concentrated in the south-western wet zone. The population of the Northern and Eastern provinces accounts for about 14 per cent of the total population, with the Jaffna peninsula being the only really densely populated area. The population is growing at approximately 1.2 per cent per annum.

8. Sri Lanka is a patchwork of ethnic groups and religions. The population can be divided into the majority Sinhalese (74 per cent), the Tamils (18percent), the Muslims (7 per cent) and Burghers, the descendants of colonialists (1 per cent). Similarly, while the majority (69 per cent) are Buddhist, 16 per cent are Hindu, 7 per cent are Muslim and 8 per cent are Christian. Three languages are spoken: Sinhala, Tamil and English; almost all Sinhalese are Buddhist and speak Sinhala. Tamils are mostly Hindu and speak Tamil; they are comprised of "Ceylon" or "Jaffna" Tamils (69 per cent), with a long history on the Island, and "Indian" or "estate" or "plantation" Tamils, descendants of labourers brought from southern India under British rule to work on coffee, tea and rubber plantations. The Muslims speak mostly Tamil but are distinguished by their religion.

9. In most of the country the Sinhalese form the majority. In the northern districts (including the Jaffna peninsula), the Ceylon Tamils are the largest community. The Indian Tamils reside mainly in the hill country in the central part of Sri Lanka. In the east, while Tamils and Muslims used to inhabit the area until the twentieth century, it is said that today all three communities are equally represented in terms of numbers. There are substantial Tamil and Muslim communities in the rest of the country, although they are in the minority there.

10. Sri Lanka was colonized successively by the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British, although it was the British who finally brought the whole country under a centralized system of government. However, each colonial power left its imprint upon Sri Lankan society in a variety of ways, including differential access to education and economic opportunity, often according to religion, linguistic and/or ethnic origin.

11. Before independence, under two centuries of British colonial rule English was the language of commerce and administration. The majority of SriLankans were therefore excluded from the process of government, but because English served as a bridge language between ethnic groups, minorities, particularly Tamils, filled many civil service positions. In the British colony, Tamils on the whole enjoyed better education, and were thus frequently employed under the British-run administration.

12. Since independence in 1948, the primary conflict has been between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Following independence a progressive rejection of at least parts of the Island's colonial inheritance and domestic rivalries served to accentuate ethnic and religious divisions within the country. Because of their overwhelming majority, the position of the Sinhalese became more dominant while the Tamils became increasingly marginalized. During the initial stage of the conflict, the question of language rights was the key area of contention between these communities. Sinhalese activists charged that English-educated minorities wielded disproportionate power on the national level, and that Buddhism and the culture associated with it lacked protection as long as its supporters were excluded from governing. Tamil activists, on the other hand, resented a perceived tendency on the part of Sinhalese partisans to equate their own ethnic nationalism with Sri Lankan nationalism.

13. What began as a struggle for cultural affirmation, political representation, economic advancement and linguistic parity between Sinhalese and Tamils ended in violence and armed conflict. The overriding political issue in Sri Lanka therefore became the demand by some Tamil groups for an independent Tamil State ("Ealam") comprising the Northern and Eastern provinces of the country.

14. The 14-year-old armed conflict in the north and east of Sri Lanka continues to be costly in human and economic terms. Over 50,000 persons have lost their lives, many more have been injured and over half a million are internally displaced.

15. With regard to the political developments since independence to 1993, the Special Rapporteur would like to refer to the report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng, submitted to the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to his mission in SriLanka in November 1993 (E/CN.4/1994/44/Add.1, paras. 14-21 and 26-34).

16. After the April 1994 elections, the newly appointed Government, the people's Alliance (PA), initiated a process of negotiations with the Liberation Tigers Of Tamil Ealam (LTTE). The talks were suspended in October1994 after Gamini Dissanayake, presidential candidate for the UnitedNational Party (UNP), and more than 50 others were killed at an election rally by a suicide bomber suspected of belonging to the LTTE. The delegations met again in Jaffna in early 1995 and on 8 January a cessation of hostilities agreement came into force. However, on 18 April 1995 the LTTE withdrew from the talks and renewed its attacks. In the following months, the fighting between the security forces and the LTTE intensified.

17. The Government of Sri Lanka announced on 18 May 1995 a "war for peace". The state of emergency, which had been briefly lifted at the time of the elections in 1994 and reimposed in the north and east and in Colombo and surrounding areas after the killing of the UNP presidential candidate in October 1994, was gradually extended to other parts of the country. The state of emergency was initially reinstated in parts of Gampaha district in June1995 but was extended throughout Gampaha district in September 1995, and to parts of Moneragala district in December 1995. In mid-April 1996, it was imposed throughout the country.

18. The Government also reintroduced some of the security measures that had been abolished (fully or partly) after it came to power. On 20 April 1995, two days after the LTTE withdrew from negotiations, a ban on the transport of certain items (including cement, batteries and motor vehicle spare parts) to the areas under LTTE control was reintroduced. In addition, the lagoon separating the Jaffna peninsula from the rest of the country and the coastline of all districts in the north and east were declared a "prohibited zone" and the use of force or firearms for its enforcement was authorized.

19. During the Special Rapporteur's stay in Sri Lanka, he was informed that the army was continuing Operation "Jaya Sikuru" which was launched by the Government on 13 May 1997 in order to control the main road from the south to the north of the country.[back to the contents]

B. Visit to Jaffna

20. The Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka has been under the control of the Liberation Tigers Of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) since mid-1990. Between July and December 1995 the security forces undertook two large military operations, code-named "Operation Leap Forward" and "Operation Riviresa (Sunshine)", in the western half of the Jaffna peninsula, including Jaffna town, the LTTE stronghold in the north. They took control of the town in early December. Further large military operations ("Operations Riviresa II and III") were launched in April and May 1996, resulting in the security forces taking control of the eastern side of the peninsula.

21. During the late 1995 offensive, the LTTE ordered civilians to vacate the area, including Jaffna town. Several people recounted to the Special Rapporteur how they hurriedly left Jaffna after the LTTE announced over loudspeakers on 30 October that everybody had to leave by midnight. The Special Rapporteur was told that those who refused to leave were forced to by intimidation.

22. The Jaffna peninsula, which returned under Government control in early1996, is now experiencing a process of resettlement and rehabilitation. The present population is around 470,000 persons but continues to increase progressively with the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the adjacent Vanni region. Over 300,000 people are dependent upon free government dry food rations, including 60,000 people who are still displaced within the peninsula (UNDP figures).

23. While in Jaffna, the Special Rapporteur met with Major General P.A.Karunatilake, the military commander in charge of the peninsula, and the military commander in charge of the Valikamam (the western part of the peninsula) and their respective staffs; the recently appointed Magistrate of Jaffna; the coroner and several lawyers including representatives of the BarAssociation of Jaffna. Unfortunately, and despite his specific request, the Special Rapporteur was not able to meet with representatives of the police department in Jaffna. With respect to deaths in the course of armed confrontation, the Special Rapporteur was told by the military authorities that in the Jaffna area, between January 1997 and August 1997, 32 civilians, of whom 40 per cent were women and children, were killed; 68 LTTE members and41 security officers were also reportedly executed.

24. The Special Rapporteur wishes to note that while in Jaffna town, and despite the curfew which is still in force from 8p.m. to 5a.m., he generally observed that during daylight, there were visible signs of an easing of tension in the life of the people. However, although there has been a re-establishment of a government administration in the Jaffna peninsula, the military remain in control of the city.

25. By the time of the Special Rapporteur's visit in September, conditions had improved but concern about the freedom of movement, fear of disappearances, arbitrary arrests and executions remained. According to people in Jaffna, the fact that they are Tamils casts suspicion on them, regardless of whether they are sympathizers to LTTE or not.

26. The security forces, comprised of members of the army and the police, are 99 per cent Singhalese, do not speak Tamil, which is the language of the local population, and very often treat the local population with suspicion. This amplifies the sense of an army occupation and exacerbates the already existing feeling of alienation.

27. With regard to the freedom of movement in Jaffna, the military has put into place checkpoints throughout the streets of the city to control the movement of civilians; the inhabitants are systematically inspected several times a day. For Tamils, travelling from Jaffna peninsula to other parts of the country involves such complicated procedures that it is virtually impossible, in particular for people wanting to travel to Colombo. A pass system involving the issuing of residence passes, day passes, week passes and passes for travel to Colombo has been in place since 1991. Furthermore, the military told the Special Rapporteur that for security reasons it had instituted procedures for people crossing from territories controlled by the LTTE to territories controlled by the security forces. People who arrived from LTTE-controlled areas were often described as "defectors" by the military, who were apparently unclear about how to process their cases.

28. The judiciary and the courts in Jaffna did not function for almost10years, from 1986 to 1996. During the Special Rapporteur's visit, he was told that only Jaffna Court was functioning.

Meeting with the Magistrate

29. During the Special Rapporteur's meeting with the Magistrate in Jaffna, he was told that the Office had reopened on 1 March 1996. By the time of the visit, there was one Magistrate and three judges (one in Jaffna, one in Mailakan and one in Kayts). They deal with all civil and criminal cases. According to the Magistrate, most of the criminal cases concern trade in illicit liquors and disputes over lands.

30. With regard to the number of extrajudicial killings in Jaffna, the Magistrate indicated to the Special Rapporteur that 38 cases had been filed, resulting from confrontations reported by the police, with his Office for the period January to September 1997. With respect to such cases, a post-mortem examination is carried out and the Magistrate receives the report. After a post-mortem, the Magistrate cannot automatically deliver a death certificate; an inquiry is needed. Of the 38 cases, 31 involved murders which fell under the Emergency Regulations and thus, without any inquiry, they were sent to the Deputy Inspector General of Police. As a result, the Magistrate was unable to deliver death certificates to the families, because there was no registration of the deaths. As such, families cannot receive any compensation. The Magistrate added that the bodies of the terrorists are not given back to the families and that he had no records of death of women or children under the Emergency Regulations; all such deaths were determined to have occurred under the normal regulations.

31. With regard to detention cases, the Magistrate reported that there were no cases of death while in custody and that every two weeks he receives a list of persons in detention; according to a list received in August, the number was 31 persons. However, the Magistrate was not informed when a person was moved from one centre of detention to another.
C. Visit to Batticaloa
The judiciary in Batticaloa: meeting with the lawyers
II. THE RIGHT TO LIFE: FINDINGS AND CONCERNS

A. Violations of the right to life in the context of armed conflict
(a) At Kalmadu camp on 24April1997, at about 3:00p.m., theLTTE and the military engaged in a shoot-out. Civilians from the camp fled towards the jungle to avoid the crossfire. According to reports, soldiers from other camps in the area fired in the direction of the shooting. Civilians from thecamp were caught in the shellfire which continued until about 6p.m. Fivepeople from the camp, including a four-year-old girl, were reportedly killed and 12others were injured, including eightchildren;

(b) In Kallady, Batticaloa, on 24August1997, four-year-old MarisSulosanathevi was killed following shelling by theLTTE at Kallady Veloor colony, which is about 3km from Batticaloa town and about 3-4km from Kallady army camp. Thirteen other people were also reported to be seriously injured in the attack.
B. Violations of the right to life committed by the LTTE
(a) On 1June1997, a Sinhala youth married to a Tamil woman was killed by theLTTE in Shanthiveli in Batticaloa;

(b) On 9June, R.K.GunaratnaBanda, a farmer in Amparai, was shot dead by theLTTE, and on 12June, S.Krishnapillai was also shot dead by members of the LTTE "pistol gang" in Valaichchenai. On 19June, at GramaSevaka in Amparai district, S.R.M.D.Banda was also shot dead by LTTEmembers.
C. Violations of the right to life committed by home guards
(a) On 27September1996, at Marathamunai, Batticaloa district, a number of Muslim home guards were reportedly abducted by armed men. Their bodies were found in the cemetery the next day. Muslims in the area accused theLTTE of the murders and there were also anti-Tamil incidents which resulted in more than 30people killed;

(b) On 9February1997, in Valaichchenai, a Muslim home guard attached to the Valaichchenai police station was allegedly killed by theLTTE in Ottamavadi, near Valaichchenai. This resulted in a clash between Tamils and Muslims in the town. ThreeTamils were reported killed and several injured. ThreeMuslims were later abducted by theLTTE, as a reprisal, and killed.[back to the contents]

D. Violations of the right to life committed in the context of political violence
(a) On 25February, at Pamunugama, internal rivalry within thePA resulted in the death from shock of a woman and damage to fivehouses. The complaint was lodged by a PA supporter against sevenother PA supporters, and allegedly the initial incident which sparked off the tragedy, related to the putting up of a poster. No arrests had been made by the police despite the alleged assailant being identified;

(b) On 27February1997, PA member of Parliament D.M.Dassanayake isalleged to have forcibly entered the Madawakkulama mosque in Puttalam district, accompanied by a gang of men armed with T-56 rifles, and destroyed all the green lights in the mosque because green was the UNP colour. This gang is alleged to have abused the devotees present and threatened the UNP Muslim candidate with death if he did not withdraw from the election. On the same day, at around 4.30p.m., Mr.Dassanayake, accompanied by approximately 50armed supporters, is alleged to have stormed Karaitive (sic) village, brutally assaulted Mr.David, the brother of UNP candidate Mr.MarcusFernando, and threatened him with death. On 1March, at 5.30p.m., Mr.Dassanayake and his supporters allegedly assaulted Mr.W.M.Wimalaratne Banda (a former UNP official) and his aides at Madyama, Attavilluwa. In all 10people were injured, three of them seriously. It is further alleged that Mr.Dassanayake's party was escorted to and from the scene of the alleged crime by a police group led by the Inspector of Police of Puttalam.
III. APPLICABLE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

A. Human rights and humanitarian law
"1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

"To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

"(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

"(b) Taking of hostages;

"(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

"(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." [back to the contents]

B. The relevance of the situation of armed conflict
C. The national legislation

1. Legal framework
2. Prevention of Terrorism Act
"any police officer not below the rank of Superintendent or any other police officer not below the rank of sub-Inspector authorized in writing by him ... may, without warrant, ... notwithstanding anything in any other law to the contrary

"(a) arrest any person;

"(b) enter and search any premises;

"(c) stop and search any individual or any vehicle, vessel, train or aircraft; and

"(d) seize any document or thing connected with or concerned in any unlawful activity."

The Act also provides that a person may be detained for periods of up to18months (renewable by order every 3months), if "the Minister has reason to believe or suspect that any person is connected with or concerned in any unlawful activity" (sect.9). The same section provides that such a person may be detained "in such place and subject to such conditions as may be determined by the Minister". This may lead to having persons detained without access to attorneys or to relatives for prolonged periods.
3. Emergency Regulations Act
Emergency regulations relating to inquests into the death of persons due to actions of police officers or members of the armed forces
(a) The purpose of an inquest is to determine the manner and circumstances of death and a proper means of doing this is provided by the normal law. The bypassing of the normal law by the emergency regulations is, however, made dependent on significant questions of fact, including (i) that the death took place in the course of an "armed confrontation" and (ii) that the victim was engaged in waging war against the Government. How are these questions to be determined except by a proper judicial inquest?

(b) The words "where a police officer or a member of the armed services has reason to believe ..." are the key. What triggers off the whole process of avoiding an inquest is the claim, by any police officer or any member of the armed services, that there was an armed confrontation and that the victim was waging war, etc.

(c) It is sufficient for the police or security officer to make the claim of armed confrontation for an inquest to be avoided.
(a) The inquiry into the death takes place only upon the application of the IGP and there are no criteria to guide him in the exercise of his function. Indeed it would be difficult to expect impartiality from him where his own officers would be involved. This may put him in an unacceptable and difficult situation;

(b) The post-mortem report should not be kept secret when death occursin circumstances specified in regulation 43. Relatives or their representatives should have access to it;

(c) It might be necessary to have more courts than just the High Court in Colombo inquire into such deaths;

(d) It is unsatisfactory that the recording of evidence by the judge should be confined to "evidence as may be placed before him by the IGP or his representative". The judge should also be permitted to receive evidence as he deems fit. This was reportedly the case in an earlier version of the regulations which empowered the Court to hear "the evidence of any other person who appears to be acquainted with the circumstances relating to the death under inquiry", but this was deleted in 1989;

(e) There should be provision for relatives or any other person representing the dead person to intervene in the proceedings. The findings of the High Court should also be made available to them.
(a) Year 1996:

(i) From the Eastern Province - 321; from the NorthernProvince-378;

(ii) Number of concluded matters - 679; the remaining matterswould be concluded once the necessary documents areavailable,

(b) Year 1997:

(i) From the Eastern Province - 127; from the NorthernProvince- 221;

(ii) Number of concluded matters - 238; the remaining matters would be concluded expeditiously. In most of the unattended cases the delay could be attributed to the non-availability of some of the documentary evidence such as the government analyst's report, the ballistics expert's report, etc. Once the reports are made available by the relevant authorities these matters would be finalized speedily.
IV. ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA REGARDING CASES OF EXTRAJUDICIAL, SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS

A. Investigation of cases of human rights violations
This incident took place on 7 September 1996 at a security checkpoint manned by a group of military personnel. Prompt action was taken by the police uponreceiving the complaint and at the conclusion of the investigations 11suspects, consisting of 8army soldiers and 3police, were arrested, produced before the Magistrate and placed in remand custody. It was decided by the Attorney-General to grant a pardon to two suspects who were not directly involved, on condition that they testify against the others.
B. Human Rights Commission
Dr. A.T. Ariyaratne - Head of Sarvodaya (a humanitarian NGO)

Prof. Arjuna Aluwihare - Former Chairman, University Grants Commission

Mr. T. Suntheralingham - Retired High Court Judge

Mr. Ahmed Javid Yusuf - Former Sri Lankan Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

The appointments were made by the President on the recommendations of the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Speaker and the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament. It should be noted that the opinions of Tamil and Muslim political parties were also sought.
C. Commissions of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal and Disappearances
D. Drafting of a new constitution
V. IMPUNITY
(a) It was possible, in the middle of Colombo, in a residential housing estate, close to the police station, to abduct a well-known personality, in what could be described as a military-style operation. The perpetrators must have felt that they could do this unimpeded, especially as they had alerted a person known to de Zoysa that they were on their way (see below);

(b) A person who knew the victim was forced at gunpoint to disclose deZoysa's address. He immediately telephoned a friend, who in turn notified a Senior Superintendent of Police of the risk to Richard de Zoysa. This officer in turn rang Welikade police station which is situated very close to de Zoysa's house. Had this telephone call been made and acted on promptly, the Welikade police should have been able to prevent the abduction or apprehend the abductors. (Note that Richard de Zoysa's own house had no telephone so his friends were unable to warn him themselves.);

(c) When the police did arrive at the scene, after the abduction, they did not take the usual investigatory steps such as testing the premises for fingerprints;

(d) Despite the fact that Dr. Saravanamuttu claimed she could identify two of the abductors, she was never asked by the police to give a description of them;

(e) A possible motive for the killing was revealed by the State-owned news agency, Lanka Puwath, which stated that police had informed the agency that investigations revealed that de Zoysa was an activist for the Sinhalese Nationalist Party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and that he had been sending false messages regarding human rights violations overseas. In a written statement read out to Parliament the head of Lanka Puwath said, "I obtained this news item from a reliable police source whom I have found totally responsible and accurate in my past experience". Moreover, the State Minister for Defence had earlier read a statement to Parliament concerning people who were sending "false information" about human rights violations abroad, to influence donors and prevent aid flows to Sri Lanka. A subsequent news item in a State-controlled newspaper stated that intelligence sources had submitted to the Defence Ministry a list of "80 names of influential people" who had supported the subversives;

(f) Once Dr. Saravanamuttu made the identification of the man who had abducted her son, it was a clear duty of the police to question neighbours and other witnesses as to whether they had seen a person so described on the night of the abduction;

(g) There was a distinct lack of interest on the part of the police to investigate the death threats received by Dr. Saravanamuttu and her lawyer. In the latter's case, the language of the threat, with its reference to foreign aid, clearly reflects the sentiments described in paragraph (e) above. Indeed, several complainants, witnesses and lawyers have been subjected to death threats, harassment, or allegedly killed;

(h) There was apparent collusion between the police and the lawyers for the suspect, to such an extent that the Magistrate felt commpelled to comment, "(a)t this stage I inquire from [prosecutor] Gamini Perera as to whether Mr. Godfrey Gunasekera, who appears with him, is in this court on behalf of the prosecution or to conduct the defence. I have seen him on several occasions secretively whispering certain things to counsel for the suspect". Mr. Gunasekera is a Senior Superintendent of Police who appeared in court that day for the first time, the day the police had been ordered to produce the suspected police officer.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) Removal of provisions which dispense with post-mortems and inquests when deaths have occurred in custody or as a result of official action of the security forces. This could be simply done by returning to normal inquest procedures under ordinary law;

(b) The Government should allow public access to the records of all inquiries, into deaths in custody or as a result of action by the security forces held in the High Court under the provisions of the ERs;

(c) Time-limits for bringing a person before a judge following his arrest should not exceed a reasonable maximum time-limit;

(d) The emergency regulations should be compiled and codified.
(a) Give a full public accounting of the scope and extent of the crimes committed in the name of the State and the political and institutional factors that contributed to the impunity of their authors;

(b) Formally identify the individual responsibility for such crimes, including the direct perpetrators and those who may have given the explicit or implicit orders for their commission;

(c) Instigate the corresponding criminal and disciplinary proceedings, to be carried out by the competent organs;

(d) Ensure effective reparation to the victims or their dependants, including adequate compensation and measures for their rehabilitation;

(e) Make recommendations that would help to prevent further violations in the future.

Members of the Commission should have access to all places of detention without prior notification, be assured of repeated visits and meet prisoners in private.



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