xxxxxxxxxx | Address of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour to the 81st Session of the Human Rights Committee | xxxxxxxxxx |
Check against delivery Address of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour 81st Session of the Human Rights Committee Palais Wilson, Monday 12 July 2004 I welcome you to the 81st session of the Human Rights Committee. This will remain a memorable occasion for me, as it happens to be the first address I deliver in Geneva as High Commissioner. I very much look forward to working with you, as well as with the other treaty bodies and, as I begin to understand the full scope of my new position, I am convinced that your experience and advice will be of great help; I know that I can count on your support. Let me begin by re-affirming what my predecessors have underlined consistently, and what I also consider to be both obvious and critical: namely, that the treaty body system is a central pillar of the United Nations human rights edifice. The successful implementation of the principal human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is not of abstract value; rather it is crucial to the realization of peoples' universal aspirations for peace, justice, development, equality and social progress. Moreover, in my view, the rigorous implementation of treaties is essential for the preservation and promotion of the Rule of Law. Not only is compliance with treaty obligations the best human rights safeguard, but lack of compliance generates cynicism and general disrespect for the law. Lack of compliance visits an additional indignity upon those whose rights have been violated: the indignity of a broken promise, a betrayal of trust. Afghanistan, Darfur, Iraq: these examples show us that the prevention of, and solution to, conflicts depends on the implementation of fundamental human right standards. Respect for human rights and human security are inextricably linked. Rights are invariably violated in situations of violence; history is replete with examples of this terrible linkage and, all too sadly, this is still the situation in the world today. Conflict not only has an immediate devastating impact on the rights of those caught up in its unfolding; it also has a malevolent, lingering presence, hindering progress in all spheres of life, civil, political, as well as cultural, economic and social. The procedures of your Committee, and of other treaty bodies, contribute to highlighting the link between human rights and human security. When monitoring compliance with the Covenant under the reporting procedure, this link becomes almost painfully obvious in many instances. In this context, I have noted with great interest your General Comment No.31 on the nature of the general legal obligations imposed on States parties to the Covenant, adopted only three months ago. Your pronouncements on the applicability of the Covenant to national contingents of international peace-keeping operations, as well as to multi-national forces, and on the interdependence between principles of humanitarian law and human rights law are important and timely and deserve wider dissemination. The Rule of Law Unit of my Office is studying the implications of this General Comment, including for our own field presences. General Comment No.31 can be linked to the equally important General Comment No.29 on states of emergencies, which has become a reference point in the discussion, at least in the UN fora that I am aware of, on the need to reconcile the struggle against terrorism with respect for fundamental human rights standards. Only three weeks ago, in what was one of the last judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada in which I participated, I had an opportunity to address an aspect of this difficult issue. We concluded that the successful protection of citizens and the successful protection of their rights are not only compatible with each other but are, indeed, interdependent. There can be no genuine personal security if rights are in peril, any more than legal guarantees can exist in an environment of fear and anarchy I am happy that your Committee has already addressed this issue, in different language but substantively identical terms. I am also pleased that you regularly engage States parties to the Covenant on whether their counter-terrorism legislation or the measures they take to combat terrorism are compatible with the Covenant. Several of your concluding observations adopted since the end of 2001 have noted how anti-terrorism regulations may operate to undermine Covenant guarantees. Your work in this area, and that of the other treaty bodies, provides a crucial supplement to the work of the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee. Your own Committee's cooperation with the CTC deserves particular mention in this context. I hope that the recent joint meeting between the treaty body chairpersons and the special procedures mandate holders will lead to further and improved coordination between the two sets of mechanisms in this field. Allow me to say a few words on a subject that I will have to familiarize myself with in the coming weeks and months: that of reform of treaty body procedures and in particular the reporting procedures. The Third Inter-Committee meeting, which was convened on 21 and 22 June, examined a first draft of consolidated Guidelines on a Common Core Document. Participants have welcomed the draft and designated a rapporteur who will work on the subject with my colleagues, in preparation for next year's Inter-Committee meeting, and I hope will make further proposals. I encourage you to study the draft guidelines on the Common Core Document and to discuss their substance in an open and constructive approach. In the meantime, Timor Leste has indicated that it intends to follow the Common Core Document approach, supplemented by treaty-specific reports. My office is committed to providing the required technical assistance for this purpose. I have been briefed about your work under the Optional Protocol procedure and am impressed by the large number of cases currently pending. To process and decide on such a large number of complaints in a timely manner requires efficient decision-making procedures. I note that you will discuss your working methods under the Optional Protocol during this session. This is an endeavor that I fully support, and my office and in particular the Petitions Unit will assist you in whichever way we can. Finally, as a former judge and prosecutor, I will follow with particular interest the development of the case law of human rights treaty bodies, and in particular your jurisprudence under the Optional Protocol. The Committee's case law under the Optional Protocol is coming close to being a truly universal human rights jurisprudence. I view as a very positive development your willingness to take cognizance of the jurisprudence of regional human rights bodies and to study the implications of evolving national jurisprudence when faced with delicate issues of interpretation of Covenant provisions in pending cases. This growing 'interdependence' between and 'cross-fertilization' of the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies, regional human rights bodies and national courts in the interpretation of human rights related issues can only yield benefits to all. The Supreme Court of Canada has, if I may add, played its own role in this respect, for instance in its 1991 judgment on Ng & Kindler and 2001 decision on Burns & Rafey (extradition to a country where the complainant faces a capital sentence) , as well in a recent judgment on s. 43 of the Canadian Tribunal which justifies the use of 'reasonable force' by parents and teachers in correcting a child or pupil (where the Court and in particular the dissenting judges were careful to evaluate the compatibility of S.43 with international standards – Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth & the Law v. AG of Canada, 2004 SCC 4) . Several tribunals in Europe and in Africa have played a significant role as well. Few will challenge the desirability of achieving consistency in the interpretation of often almost identical concepts and guarantees in the human rights-related jurisprudence of international and regional bodies and national tribunals. In addition, I see a need to make the jurisprudence of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies more accessible and more visible: for example through dissemination in jurisprudential digests, or through improved databases with more effective search engines. As relevant and noteworthy as your decisions undoubtedly are, it is a regrettable fact that they remain unknown to the vast majority of members of the legal profession, including many human rights lawyers. That situation must change in order to foster a consistent evolution and application of human rights standards worldwide. In conclusion, let me once again wish you a productive and successful session. |